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I. INTRODUCTION
The word Nebraska conjures up images of college football and the
Unicameral. Each is a notable institution with an almost mystical
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quality. That each has been successful for so long is remarkable. It is
easy to explain the Huskers' accomplishments-great coaching and
recruiting. But, the reasons for the Unicameral's prosperity are less
apparent. Now sixty years old, Nebraskans seem to have accepted the
Unicameral, but its one house and nonpartisan features remain
unique among legislatures in the United States.
This Article will not discuss the success of Nebraska football, but it
will address the baffling nature of the nonpartisan Nebraska Unicam-
eral, how it came to be, why and how it works, why it is superior to
partisan bicameral legislatures, and why it will remain the sole non-
partisan unicameral in the nation.' Much scholarship has addressed
the Nebraska Unicameral from the perspective of those who helped to
create it,2 were part of its process,3 and have studied it.4 Yet, little
has been written about the benefits of a nonpartisan system in a one-
house legislature. This Article attempts to fill that void and explain
why the nonpartisan unicameral system is preferable.
Throughout its relatively short history, attempts have been made
to return the Unicameral to a partisan organization. This is true in
recent years.5 On these occasions, the political parties heat up the
rhetoric, urging that committee chairpersons be elected by partisan
1. Nebraska is the only state unicameral. Many countries have unicameral legisla-
tures, but all are partisan: Aruba, Benin, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Repub-
lican of Ghana, Guam, Guyana, Moldova, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, State of
Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mon-
tenegro, Micronesia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Nova Scotia, Panama,
Singapore, Suriname, Turkey, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Zaire.
Minnesota had a statutory nonpartisan bicameral legislature for nearly fifty
years, but in the early 1970s, the legislature switched to a partisan system. RoB-
ERT SiTrIG, THE NEBRASKA UNICAMERAL AFrER FIFTY YEARS 31 (1986).
2. John P. Senning, former Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska,
wrote The One-House Legislature in 1936, two years after the new system was
adopted. Senning was instrumental in drafting the language of the ballot initia-
tive. Included is a foreword by Senator George W. Norris. JOHN P. SENNING, THE
ONE-HousE LEGISLATURE (1937).
3. Hugo F. Srb, The Unicameral Legislature-a Successful Innovation, 40 NEB. L.
REv. 626 (1961). Srb was a member of the Legislature from 1931 to 1933. He
also served as the first Clerk of the Nebraska Unicameral, holding that position
for 32 years.
4. See, e.g., SrITIG, supra note 1; NONPARISANSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
(John C. Comer & James B. Johnson eds., 1978).
5. SirrIG, supra note 1. One such attempt was made this year. See Bill Hord, Sena-
tor Witek Playing Down Party Ties in Speaker Race, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan.
8, 1997, at 6; Bill Hord et al., Speaker Post Goes Again to Withem, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Jan. 8, 1997, at 8; Bill Hord, Speaker Race Could Test GOP Clout,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 4, 1997, at 11; Bill Hord, State Senators Criticize
GOP Pressure: Three Say Party Went Too Far in Support of Senator Witek's Bid
for Speaker's Post Committee Chairman, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 9, 1997, at
3; A Victory for Independence, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1. See
also Patrick J. O'Donnell, A Unicameral Legislature, J. AM. Soc'y LEGIS. CLERKS
& SECRETMuES 3 (Spring 1996).
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coalitions, that the Speaker be determined by the majority party,6 or
that the entire operation be changed in the Nebraska Constitution to a
partisan process. 7 Despite these efforts, the members of the Unicam-
eral, as they have done for the past sixty years, ignore these pleas and
elect the member they believe will best serve the body as a leader-
often a Democrat, despite a Republican majority.8 While many sena-
tors join the Legislature with strong partisan ties and the belief that a
nonpartisan system is foolish, within a short time they become true
believers in the one-house, nonpartisan process. Ask any senator why
they keep the system and you will hear the same answer-it works.
II. BACKGROUND
United States Senator George Norris is credited with creating the
Nebraska Unicameral. After five terms in the United States House of
Representatives and five terms in the United States Senate as both a
Republican and an Independent, Norris was passionate that a nonpar-
tisan unicameral was the only way to ensure that government was
accountable to the people.
While a unicameral form of government was his passion, it was not
originally Norris' idea. Unicameralism was often advocated at the
turn of the nineteenth century.9 An initiative effort and a constitu-
tional convention to eliminate one of two then-existing houses were
each attempted in Nebraska in reaction to nonresponsive legislatures.
Each effort failed.1O While there was much interest in Norris' idea,
6. See infra section II.C.
7. The Nebraska Constitution provides that members shall be elected on a nonparti-
san basis. NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 7.
8. As it has done so many times over the years, history has repeated itself. In the
first session of the Unicameral, the members selected a Republican, Charles
Warner, as Speaker, despite a Democratic majority. Nebraska: Only 43
Lawmakers Meet in Norris' Single House, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1937, at 10 [here-
inafter Norris' Single House]. In 1997, the Unicameral, with a Republican major-
ity, elected Rn Withem, a Democrat, as Speaker.
9. George Norris did not invent the Unicameral. Three of the original thirteen
states, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Georgia, created one-house legislatures in
their first constitutions adopted during the American Revolution. Each was cou-
pled with a council or board of censors that acted more or less as a separate house
and generally complicated politics. Georgia kept the arrangement for 12 years,
Pennsylvania for 14 years, and Vermont until 1836. Nebraska R.F.D. to F.D.R.,
TmE MAG., Jan. 11, 1937, at 16. By the early 1900s, the concept of unicameral-
ism started percolating in several states. The Governors of Arizona, California,
Kansas, Minnesota, Washington, and South Dakota recommended the idea. The
concept was placed on the ballot, but was defeated in Arizona, Oklahoma, and
Oregon. In 1915, a joint legislative committee in Nebraska recommended the
idea. It died for lack of interest. Jim McKee, Reasons Behind Unicameral Legis-
lature Appear to Stand, LINcoLN J. STAa, June 5, 1995, at 7. See also Norris'
Single House, supra note 8, at 10.
10. SrrnG, supra note 1, at 3-5.
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there was little or no support for it. Spurred by these losses, Norris
became actively involved in the debate in 1923 when he published his
famous expose in the New York Times, "A Model State Legislature.""-
Norris advocated more than just a one-house legislature. He firmly
believed partisan politics were detrimental to the democratic process
and was vocal in promoting his view of partisan politics. i 2
Often using his experiences to explain his convictions, Norris
would tell a story from his first term as a Congressman from Ne-
braska. He had been assigned by the Republican Speaker of the
House to the House Committee on Public Grounds and Buildings. At
the initial meeting of the committee, discussions ensued about a pub-
lic building bill. It appeared obvious to everyone, except Norris, that
the Speaker would make the decision as to whether or not a bill would
be introduced. A motion to seek a conference with the Speaker to ob-
tain his permission to introduce the bill passed unanimously. Norris
was flabbergasted. The Speaker was not a member of the committee
and was not informed of the issues at stake. He could not understand
why the Speaker should play a role in the matter, much less deter-
mine the final decision. It soon became crystal clear to Norris that the
Speaker's power was tied to his partisan power to appoint committee
members and to bestow favors on his friends.13 Norris later stated,
I believe the light dawned upon me and I began to see for the first time that
the Republican Party was subject to influences similar to those that I believed
controlled the Democratic Party; and soon I learned there was no difference
between the parties.... Both of them were machine-controlled. 1 4
Norris discovered that blind partisanship was the way of life in
Congress as well. He was asked to follow congressional leadership
when his conscience told him otherwise, which led to illogical posi-
tions.15 Yet, the system worked because it often resulted in legislative
favors and appointments. To get along, you had to go along; and Nor-
ris could not stomach a system that played such games hidden from
public view. He held his ground and frequently ignored party leader-
ship.16 As a result, he was not recognized with congressional appoint-
ments or pork. He soon became famous, however, for his radical
departure from the norm.1 7
11. George W. Norris, A Model State Legislature, reprinted in One Branch Legisla-
ture For States Would Improve Results, N.Y. Trams, Jan. 28, 1923, at 12 [herein-
after Norris, One Branch Legislature].
12. GEORGE W. NoRis, FIGHTING LIBERAL 92-93 (1945).
13. Id. at 95-96.
14. Id. at 96. The bill from the committee was approved by the Speaker and passed
easily with virtually no debate. It was full of pork for those who supported it, and
all who were faithful were rewarded. Id. at 96-97.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 97.
17. Id. Norris lost any standing he had with party powers when he bucked the cau-
cus system in the House. It was the rule of the day that when the party cau-
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In 1934, Colonel John G. Maher, a Lincoln insurance man and a
friend and supporter of Norris, called a meeting to discuss an initia-
tive effort to create a unicameral legislature. Norris attended, as did
800 others, including a political science professor, John P. Senning,
and former Congressman John Norton.8 It was from this meeting
that Norris embarked on what he later described as a journey to cre-
ate a legacy that would benefit Nebraskans and their children long
after he was dead.19 Teams were formed to garner signatures and
support. Still, the idea did not seem to take hold. Circulators were so
hard to find that the group ended up paying people to gather signa-
tures-a nickel per name. 20
The issue was considered all but dead when Norris arrived back in
the state only weeks before the election.2 1 Without hesitation, he
headed out across the state, paying his own way, to sell the idea.2 2
His arguments were threefold: (1) the fundamental principle of two
houses was no longer valid; (2) the Conference Committee in essence
created a third house that was secretive and antidemocratic; and (3) a
nonpartisan legislature would be more open and less prone to special
interests, and less expensive.2 3
First, Norris argued the fundamental principle of a two-house sys-
tem was not valid for state government. The legacy of two houses
originated in England, where the House of Lords was created to pro-
tect the rich aristocracy from the commoners in the House of Coin-
cused, the members of that party absolutely and automatically would follow the
decision of the caucus. Norris announced at one such caucus that he would not be
bound by any decision that did not "agree with my conscientious convictions."
During his five terms in the House of Representatives, he created such a backlash
to the caucus that it eventually was abolished. Id.
In 1910, Republican Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon, was a powerful parti-
san. Waiting for the opportune moment in a debate, Norris pulled a tattered
piece of paper from his pocket that contained a resolution that effectively would
destroy the Speaker's power. When the Speaker declared the resolution out of
order, Norris appealed to the House. He rallied dissident Republicans and mem-
bers of the opposing party. Norris waged debate on the resolution for 36 solid
hours without sleep. When the smoke cleared and the votes were counted, Norris
had won. This effort made George Norris a household name in political circles.
Nebraska R.F.D. to F.D.R., supra note 9, at 16-18.
18. NoRms, supra note 12, at 345.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 348.
21. RicHARD L. NEUBERGER & STEPHEN B. KAHN, INTEGRTY: THE LIF OF GEORGE W.
NoRRs 284 (1937).
22. Id.
23. See Both Sides of One-House Plan are Discussed, NORFOLK DAILY NEws, Oct. 15,
1934, at 2; One House Amendment Debated at Federation, FAnmuRY J., Oct. 11,
1934, at 7; Partisanship Evil is Flayed by Norris in Talk Friday Evening, SIDNEY
TEL., Oct. 23, 1934, at 1 [hereinafter Partisanship Evil].
19971
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mons.2 4 Likewise, the American federal system, based on the English
version, was constructed as a check and balance. The Senate origi-
nally was elected by the state legislatures25 to represent the states or
property. The House of Representatives was elected by the people to
represent the individual and was the only opportunity at the time for
a direct vote by the people.2 6 When the states drafted their constitu-
tions, they simply followed the federal model. Interestingly, most ma-
jor cities also followed the federal model and designed two council
systems. 2 7
Norris had no reverence for the time-entrenched system that origi-
nally was premised on a caste system. "Assuming two such classes
exist and that their interests conflict, there is some reason for a two-
house legislature, but in this country we have no such classes and the
constitutions of our various States are built upon the idea that there is
but one class."2 8 He wanted the state to be run like a business, and no
business would have two boards of directors-one simply to check on
the work of the other. Two houses simply served to obscure the pro-
cess from the public. 29 At the time, the Supreme Court had not yet
ruled that the "one man, one vote" doctrine applied to state legisla-
tures.3 0 It was believed, however, that in most states the house and
senate generally were of the same composition. "Each is composed of
men elected in the same way having the same jurisdiction."3 1
Second, Norris contended that the Conference Committee was se-
cretive, antidemocratic, and the greatest obstacle to public under-
standing and input.3 2 The Conference Committee is the body that is
24. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 277-78. See also JOURNAL OF THE NE-
BRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2126-27 (Clyde H. Bernard ed., 1921).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 277-78. But see
U.S. CONST. art. XVII.
26. Originally, the President was not elected directly by popular vote of the people,
but instead by the electoral college. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Senator Norris advo-
cated eliminating the electoral college. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at
185.
27. ALVIN WALTER JOHNSON, THE UNicAMERAL LEGISLATURE 93-94 (1938); Saul
Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INTL
REV. L. & ECON. 145, 161 n.43 (1992). See also Partisanship Evil, supra note 23.
By 1911, most large cities recognized that two councils were unwieldy and unnec-
essary and thus changed to a one council system. Unicameral System Praised by
Speaker, NEB. CITY NEWS, Oct. 12, 1934, at 1.
28. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 278.
29. Levmore, supra note 27, at 161 n.43.
30. Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 367 (1963).
31. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 278.
32. Norris, One Branch Legislature, supra note 11, at 12. When a bill is first passed
by each House, differences are inevitable. When that occurs, the bills are re-
ported to the Conference Committee. At that time, the Conference Committee
consisted of six men, three from the House and three from the Senate. The com-
mittee could amend the bill in any manner it wished, change it completely, add
pork, or simply reconcile provisions. It was in the Conference Committee that
[Vol. 76:791
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necessary to ensure the two houses can reach agreement. As all votes
in conference were secret, Norris maintained that Conference Com-
mittee members frequently used the Conference Committee to hide
from their constituents. As a result, other legislators could avoid ac-
countability as well. The Conference Committee wielded great power
because anything voted out of conference could not be amended in
either house. The representative could vote for a measure before con-
ference, but vote against it after conference, explaining it simply was
not the same bill. Or, he could hope the bill would die in conference
and explain to his constituents that although he favored the measure,
he simply was unable to vote for it.33 Responsibility shifted to the
unaccountable "third" house-the Conference Committee. The bill
would be voted up or down in whatever format the conference deter-
mined. Because any number of games could be and often were played
in conference, Norris believed that a unicameral would eliminate the
evil and pranks of conference.
Third, Norris argued that a nonpartisan, single-house legislature
would be more accountable to the public and would be less expensive.
The decrease in cost is obvious. If the Unicameral was comprised of
twenty to thirty members, as Norris wanted,3 4 there would be opera-
tional and administrative savings. There was debate, however, about
how small the new Unicameral should be. The final language of the
initiative was a compromise tied to members' salaries. A total salary
of $37,500 would be divided by the total number of senators, which
could not be fewer than thirty and not more than fifty members. This
result created an incentive to maintain a small body of legislators.35
The openness and accountability of a single house was difficult to
explain. Norris contended that a small nonpartisan body actually
would represent the public better than two larger bodies.36 The idea
seemed counterintuitive. By avoiding ties to party bosses and
caucuses through a party structure, elected officials would be account-
able only to their constituents. With one body and the consequent
elimination of the Conference Committee, the public could follow the
Norris believed jokers" often were placed in bills and where lobbyists wielded the
most power. As only two votes could prevent a bill from emerging out of confer-
ence, a lobbyist needed to control only two men. The special interests work be-
hind the scenes and keep the public in the dark. NEUBERGER & MUH, supra note
21, at 278-79.
33. This process actually happened with a municipal power bill before the Nebraska
Legislature three times before the bill finally was adopted by a voter initiative.
See Noams, supra note 12, at 352-53.
34. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 280.
35. Nebraska had 133 members in 1934. By eliminating one house, Nebraskans
saved the salary and expense of nearly 100 members, the cost of two records, two
sets of legislation and records, not to mention the savings from eliminating each
of the elections. Partisanship Evil, supra note 23, at 1.
36. JOHNsON, supra note 27, at 133.
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process and see exactly how a senator voted on a matter. Senators
would be unable to hide their actions in a maze of procedure because
they could not use committees to obscure their true intentions. In ad-
dition, Norris believed special interests generally supported the ban-
ner of partisanship. While the nonpartisan process would simplify
lobbyists' efforts, if a senator followed a special interest, his action
would be visible to the public.
If party politics were eliminated, Norris argued, the public could
elect members according to their qualifications without being blinded
by political party issues. 37 The voter ought to be able to elect a sena-
tor based on the individual's qualifications and not based on a party's
position on a question of national importance. 38 Most importantly,
members elected in a nonpartisan system would have no incentive to
follow the dictates of party "bosses." Because the power would belong
equally to each senator without regard to party discipline or seniority,
senators no longer would be constrained to follow secret decisions, to
fall in line to receive favors, or to have their bills introduced.
Nonpartisan elections were not entirely new to Nebraska. Elec-
tions of judges, school boards members, municipal officials, and uni-
versity regents were all nonpartisan.3 9 The reason Nebraska had so
many nonpartisan offices was to secure independence from a governor
who at times could exert "an undesirable extent of control."40
37. Partisanship Evil, supra note 23.
38. The nonpartisan feature of Nebraska's unicameral initiative was unique to Nor-
ris. No other state's effort contained the provision, nor did anyone quite under-
stand Norris' strong abhorrence to partisanism. Shortly after proposing the
concept, he attempted to explain it to his friend William Jennings Bryan. Norris
contended that while he and Bryan were from different political aisles, they nev-
ertheless often agreed on issues. "Do you remember," Norris asked Bryan, "the
campaign for State Railway Commissioner when the Democratic candidate did
not agree with your views at all, while the Republican candidate did?" "Yes, Mr.
Senator, I do," Bryan replied. "I do not think partisan politics should apply to
that particular office. But, if they do, I will stand by my fellow Democrat in the
campaign, and will feel free to denounce him unmercifully once he is elected."
NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 283.
Norris later stated,
Mr Bryan's greatest weakness was his intense partisanship. From a
party standpoint, this may be considered one of his best attributes, but
upon a high, patriotic ground, the plane on which to judge him, it was a
weakness that could hardly be imagined to exist within the heart and
soul of a man who was so intensely patriotic and courageous in fighting
for what he believed to be right. In this respect he had the attributes of
many of the leaders in the political parties-a loyalty to party that often
conflicts with the higher duty to country.
Id.
39. NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-525 (Reissue 1996); JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 134.
40. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 134.
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Many arguments were leveled against the plan.4 1 The agricultural
community feared it would lose its representation if the number of
members was small. A one-house legislature would simplify and facil-
itate the passage of more legislation due to a lack of check and bal-
ance. The nonpartisan nature would allow special interests to
dominate because parties would not be readily available to keep them
clean. Additionally, it was argued that the measure would increase
taxes.4 2
A group calling themselves the Nebraska Representative Govern-
ment Defense Organization banded together to oppose Norris. 4 3 It
feared that without the check and balance of the two-party system,
corruption, poorly reasoned legislation, and indifference would result.
It was simply "un-American."44 The body would "be composed in all
probability, mostly of lawyers."45 Most of all, the group argued, there
was no reason to do it. No other state had done it. The old system
worked just fine.4 6
Despite the strong opposition and the poorly organized campaign,
Norris' efforts carried the day. When the ballots were cast and
counted, the unicameral initiative won overwhelmingly. The measure
was "rejected in only 9 out of 93 counties, and in only 73 out of 2,029
precincts."4 7
III. WHY AND HOW THE UNICAMERAL WORKS
While states initially expressed a flurry of interest in the idea of a
one-house legislature, the idea has not taken hold beyond Nebraska.48
Nevertheless, curiosity about the lone unicameral continues today.
When the topic of Nebraska's unicameral legislature comes up in con-
versation with office holders in other states, they cannot comprehend
how the system can work. The following questions are most commonly
asked: Is it truly nonpartisan? How is the leadership elected? Who
41. With the exception of the Lincoln Star, the Hastings Tribune, and a "half of dozen
weeklies," almost all 440 newspapers in the state opposed the initiative. NoRms,
supra note 12, at 348-49. See also SENNI.NG, supra note 2, at 59. The Omaha
World Herald ran nine, full-length editorials opposing the effort in the last seven
weeks of the campaign. NoRRIs, supra note 12, at 348-49.
42. SENNNG, supra note 2, at 58. No explanation was given for the belief that taxes
would increase.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Risk Is Too Great, OmAHA WoRLD HERALD, Sept. 26, 1934, at 8.
46. Id.
47. SENNING, supra note 2, at 60. The final vote count was 286,086 for and 193,152
against. It has been argued that two other ballot measures affected the outcome,
including measures to repeal prohibition and to allow pari-mutuel gaming. The
pari-mutuel proposition prevailed by a vote of 251,111 to 187,455. Prohibition
was repealed by a vote of 328,074 to 318,107. SENNING, supra note 2, at 60-61.
48. See infra Part V.
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introduces bills? How is leadership determined? What about the
lobby? In short, outsiders simply disbelieve that a one-house legisla-
ture can function with any success. What follows is an analysis of the
process of the Nebraska Unicameral.
A. Organization
The Nebraska Unicameral is organized much like the senate of a
two-house system. The Lieutenant Governor presides over the Legis-
lature as the President of the Legislature. The Speaker serves as
President in the Lieutenant Governor's absence.49 The Speaker, who
is elected by secret ballot of all the members, sets the daily agenda,
determines the order of debate on bills, and generally keeps the busi-
ness of the Legislature moving.50 While external influences tend to
push toward a partisan influence in the selection of the Speaker,S1 the
body tends to ignore such influence and selects the person who is most
likely to move the agenda and build coalitions. 52
In a nonpartisan system in which the leadership is elected by se-
cret ballot and the Speaker cannot curry favors by granting leadership
opportunities or distributing "pork,"5 3 the Speaker cannot demand
blind following. While the Speaker has the power to "encourage" sena-
tors to vote with him, his power to reward or return favors by granting
leadership positions or special favors is vastly reduced. Instead, the
Speaker must synchronize "the efforts of nearly fifty unaffiliated sena-
tors who tend to pursue individualistic goals."5 4 Rather than wielding
partisan influence, the Speaker builds consensus through the power of
persuasion and logic and the use of the calendar. As Norris wanted,
power "does not rest in the hands of one man or several men, but in
the power of reason and common sense."55
The Executive Board is an administrative subcommittee of the en-
tire legislature. This committee is composed of a chairperson, a vice-
chairperson, the Speaker, and two members from each of the three
current congressional districts.56 In addition to handling administra-
tive matters of the legislative staff, the Board is responsible for audit-
ing the books of the Legislature and also operates as the reference
49. N EB. CONST. art. III, § 10; Neb. Unicam. Rule 1, § 5 (1997). While the Lieutenant
Governor holds the title of President, most if not all of the authority lies with the
Speaker. The Lieutenant Governor can vote only in the case of a tie. NEB.
CONST. art. III, § 14.
50. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.
51. See sources supra note 5.
52. See supra note 8. See also 86 CONG. REc. app. at 330 (1940).
53. 86 CONG. REC. 4 (1940).
54. SITrxa, supra note 1, at 19.
55. 86 CONG. REC. app. at 330 (1940).
56. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 50-401.01 (Cum. Supp. 1996). The chairperson of the Appro-
priations Committee also serves as an ex officio member.
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committee for all bills that come before the Legislature.5 7 The power
of determining where bills are placed is therefore distributed geo-
graphically across the state, and no one person or interest group can
singlehandedly manipulate the placement of a bill to a favorable
committee.
The Committee on Committees consists of the chairperson and
twelve members, three selected from each of the original four congres-
sional districts that were in existence in 1937.58 Its job is to assign
members to committees.59 By requiring even distribution of the com-
mittee membership from across the state, the power of less populated
areas is expanded, and the authority of the body is more evenly appor-
tioned. The process decreases party influence and favoritism in com-
mittee organization. While members may lobby for specific
assignments, the procedure decreases the possibility of patronage due
to the wide distribution of the decisionmaking authority across the en-
tire geographical boundaries of the state.
Fourteen Standing Committees, which are relatively small in size,
include seven to nine members per committee.6 0 The seats of each
committee are allocated on the same basis as the Committee on Com-
mittees, with two seats coming from each of the four original congres-
sional districts.61 Senators serve on one to three committees
depending on how often the committee convenes. 6 2 This distribution,
in effect, "substitutes geography for partisanship."6 3
57. Id. See also Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 4(e)(i) (1997).
58. Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 2(b) (1997). The committee chairperson is selected by the
entire membership by secret ballot. Id. Rule 1, § 1. While it is not a rule, it is the
practice of the Legislature to allocate seats to the Standing Committees on the
basis of the four original congressional districts.
59. Id. Rule 3, § 2(b). The single exception is the Appropriations Committee, for
which members are selected by the Executive Committee. Id. § 2(c).
60. Standing Committees include the following- Agriculture, Appropriations, Bank-
ing, Commerce and Insurance, Business and Labor, Education, General Affairs,
Government, Military and Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, Judici-
ary, Natural Resources, Nebraska Retirement Systems, Revenue, Transporta-
tion, and Urban Affairs. The Select Committees include the following.
Committee on Committees, Enrollment and Review, Reference, and Rules. Spe-
cial Committees include the following- Building Maintenance, Education Com-
mission of the States, Executive Board of the Legislative Council,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, and Legislative Program Evaluation. Id. §§ 3-5.
A comparison of committees across the country indicates that Nebraska has an
average number of committees compared to other states. NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATuRES, INSIDE THE LEGIsLATIvE PROCESS 62 (1991).
61. Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 2(a) (1997).
62. See SrrrI , supra note 1, at 21. The exception to this rule is the Appropriation
Committee. Its members serve on only one committee because the Appropria-
tions Committee meets five days a week. Id.
63. Id. at 22.
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The chairperson of each Standing Committee is elected by the en-
tire body, again by secret ballot, at the beginning of each biennial leg-
islature.6 4 Any member may be nominated without regard to
seniority or party affiliation, thus allowing members to elect the best
person for the job. In this process, individuals who have served for
only a short time or who happen to belong to the minority party are
not excluded from serving in a leadership position.
B. Process
Any senator may introduce legislation.6 5 Approval from the party
in power or from the leadership is not required. Legislation often is
introduced at the request of constituents or the Governor, or as a re-
sult of legislative studies.66 While nothing precludes a party from in-
troducing legislation, political parties are not formally recognized.
"[Tihe rules of the legislature require that all bills receive a public
hearing, and that the hearing be preceded by media announcement as
to date, time, room, etc."67 After the public hearing, the committee
holds an executive session to process the legislation. A bill must re-
ceive a majority vote of the members of the committee before it is ad-
vanced to the floor for consideration.6 8 While executive sessions are
closed to the public at large, the media are allowed full access and may
report what transpires.6 9 The final committee vote is public.70 By al-
lowing media access to the committee deliberations and requiring that
the Clerk of the Legislature receive a record of the roll call vote of the
final committee action,7 1 an open and public process is created.
Once a bill reaches the floor of the Legislature, it must be read four
times before passage.7 2 A minimum of three votes must approve the
bill before it may be sent to the Governor for enactment into law.73 In
the first stage of debate, General File, committee amendments, if any,
are considered.7 4 The bill may be amended further by any member
64. Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 7 (1997).
65. Id. Rule 5, § 4.
66. Id. Rule 4, § 3.
67. Id. Rule 3, § 13; SrrrIG, supra note 1, at 22-23.
68. Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 16 (1997). If the Legislature votes to postpone action
indefinitely or fails to act on the bill, the Legislature as a whole may vote to "pull"
the bill from committee. Id. §§ 17, 19.
69. Id. § 15(a). But see Kim M. Robak, Comment, Nebraska Unicameral Rule 3, Sec-
tion 15: To Whom Must the Door Be Open?, 64 NEB. L. REv. 282 (1985).
70. Neb. Unicam. Rule 3, § 18 (1997).
71. Id.
72. O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 4.
73. See generally Neb. Unicam. Rule 6 (1997). The Governor may either sign the bill
into law, allow the bill to become law without his or her signature, or veto the bill.
NEB. CoNsT. art. IV, § 15.
74. Neb. Unicam. Rule 6, § 3 (1997).
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garnering a majority of votes.75 After the first round of debate, the bill
is referred to the Enrollment and Review Committee for "recommen-
dations relative to arrangement, phraseology, and correlation."76
The next round of consideration, Select File, allows for a second
thorough deliberation of the merits of the bi1l.77 Any enrollment and
review amendments are considered and approved or rejected.7 8 Any
member again may attempt to amend the bill.79 After two opportuni-
ties for thorough debate, the bill should be in its final form. It is then
advanced to the Enrollment and Review Committee for engrossing.SO
The last stage of debate, Final Reading, requires the bill to be read
in its entirety unless the body votes by a three-fifths majority not to do
so.81 On Final Reading, the bill may not be changed. If amendments
are desired, the bill must be returned to Select File for specific amend-
ment.8 2 One legislative day must pass after a bill's reference to Final
Reading before members may vote for final passage.8 3
The potential for hasty or rapid consideration of legislation is re-
duced by the Nebraska Constitution and the rules of the body. Vari-
ous checks prevent legislation from advancing too rapidly without
consideration by the body. The Constitution requires that a minimum
of five days elapse from initial floor consideration (introduction) to Fi-
nal Reading.84 The legislative rules mandate that one legislative day
must pass after the bill is referenced from Select File to Final Read-
ing.8 5 A printed copy of the bill in its final form must be available to
all members for at least one legislative day prior to a final vote.8 6
With only one house, a Conference Committee is unnecessary.
None exists. The entire legislative body, in open deliberation, must
vote on any amendments to legislation, which is done in full view of
the public. While roll call votes are not required for all amendments,
any senator may request a record vote at any time, thus ensuring a
complete public record.87 The record vote requirement prevents legis-
lators from hiding their votes from the public or forming allegiances to
a special interest or the lobby.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 4.
77. Id. § 5.
78. Id. § 5(a).
79. Id. § 5(b).
80. Id. Rule 6.
81. NEB. CoNsT. art. m, § 14; Neb. Unicam. Rule 6, § 8 (1997).
82. Neb. Unicam. Rule 6, § 8 (1997).
83. Id. § 7(b). This one day delay is required pursuant the Nebraska Constitution.
NEB. CONST. art. IH, § 14.
84. See NEB. CONST. art. II, § 14.
85. Neb. Unicam. Rule 6, § 7(b) (1997).
86. Id. § 7(c).
87. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11. See also Neb. Unicam. Rule 7, § 2 (1997).
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C. Partisanship
Committee membership is distributed evenly across the geographi-
cal boundaries of the state. Thus, analysis and consideration of legis-
lation in committees is not necessarily or automatically weighted
toward a particular party or ideology. Likewise, as committee leader-
ship is elected at large by secret ballot, the power of the chairmanship
often is divided between liberal and conservative factions.
The formal organization of the Unicameral does not include party
discipline, caucus meetings,85 or seniority privileges. Party affiliation,
while not listed on the ballot, still is maintained, and legislators par-
ticipate in party functions, but parties do not control the selection of
leadership or the day-to-day operations of the body. The result is a
nonpartisan system in which members build coalitions around the is-
sues and attract other members from similar ideological positions.
Often, but not always, a split occurs between rural and urban
interests.8 9
D. The Lobby
Lobbyists must register their affiliation with the Legislature and a
list of all registered lobbyists is recorded in the Legislative Journal.9 0
Lobbyists are as active in Nebraska as they are in every other state.9 x
Senators rely on lobbyists for information since the system lacks a for-
mal party structure to share positions and rationale.9 2 Without for-
mal partisan coalitions, the lobby cannot rely on leadership to carry
favorable votes. Instead, the lobby must appeal to each senator indi-
vidually and obtain agreement from a minimum of twenty-five sena-
tors to secure the advancement, passage, or defeat of legislation.
While no empirical data conclusively proves that lobby power is re-
88. Formal party caucuses are not held. Informal caucuses frequently are ailed by
senators wishing to build coalitions. These caucuses may be partisan, but gener-
ally cross party lines, to some degree, to gain a sufficient voting majority.
89. The only empirical study this Author found on the subject validates the point
that party affiliation is the most important reference point in partisan legisla-
tures, while it appears to have little impact on Nebraska's nonpartisan Unicam-
eral. NoNPARTISANSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 110. This
Author has seen relatively few partisan coalition efforts in her personal experi-
ence as presiding officer of five sessions of the Legislature. Most efforts focus on
personal ideologies and constituent preferences. Coalitions almost always cross
party lines.
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-148 (Reissue 1993). See also Neb. Unicam. Rule 1, § 18(h)
(1997). Lobbyists may not enter the legislative chamber. Id. Rule 2, § 3(c).
91. This fact is evidenced by the existence of the Nebraska Political Accountability
and Disclosure Act. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 49-1480 to -1492 (Reissue 1993 & Cum.
Supp. 1996).
92. NONPARTISANSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 93.
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duced in a nonpartisan or one-house system, the openness of the pro-
cess allows full disclosure to the public of lobby influence. 93
IV. WHY A NONPARTISAN UNICAMERAL IS SUPERIOR TO A
BICAMERAL SYSTEM
When the Seventy-fifth Congress of the United States assembled in
1937, it was the first time the President and Congress took the oath of
office in January. The lame-duck amendment, as it was called, was
adopted in 1932 and required that the President and members of Con-
gress take office immediately after the first of the year rather than
waiting three months.94 Noticeably absent from the assembly was the
amendment's champion, Nebraska Senator George Norris. Instead of
celebrating his success with his colleagues, Norris was in Lincoln for
the opening day of the Nebraska Unicameral-the first session of the
nation's only one-house nonpartisan legislature.
On January 6, 1937, Norris challenged the senators at the opening
session:
I congratulate you .... Every professional lobbyist, every professional politi-
cian and every representative of greed and monopoly is hoping and praying
that your work will be a failure.... Your constituents do not expect perfec-
tion. They know that it is human to err, but they do expect and have a right to
expect absolute honesty, unlimited courage, and a reasonable degree of effi-
ciency and wisdom.... From now on Nebraska has a right to expect a busi-
ness administration. 9 5
When the session was adjourned, State Senator John Norton men-
tioned that although the system was not perfect, it was unique and
perhaps offered a new and better way of doing business. "[I believe]
the faults of the unicameral are the faults which marked the bicam-
eral, but the virtues of the unicameral are the virtues of the one-house
system alone."96 While the operation of the Unicameral has its flaws,
these flaws appear in every system and often can be corrected by
changes in the rules. A nonpartisan unicameral, however, has fea-
tures due to the very nature of its structure and its process that make
it preferable to the bicameral system.
A. Duplication
Understanding the diversity of this great nation, the founding fa-
thers had great vision. They agreed upon a compromise when creat-
93. Every legislative bill lobbied by principal or lobbyist must be disclosed to the Ne-
braska Political Accountability and Disclosure Commission. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 49-1484 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
94. U.S. CONsT. amend. XX.
95. Nebraska R.F.D. to F.D.R., supra note 9, at 17.
96. Nebraska: Unicameral Body Legislates Alone and Likes It, NEWSWEEK, May 22,
1937, at 12 (comment made by Senator John Norton aier the first session of the
Unicameral).
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ing the two-house federal legislature.9 7 Small states feared that
larger states would exert undue influence and power if population was
the sole basis of representation. Thus, the drafters drew the separate
and individual states together under one federal government and se-
cured equal representation to ensure the continuation of their distinct
sovereignty. No state would be deprived of its equal status in the Sen-
ate. 98 On the other hand, House representation would be based on
election by the people and would be "apportioned among the several
states ... according to their respective numbers."99 Each state elected
at least one member of Congress and some states elected more, de-
pending on state population. This ensured popular representation in
one body, while giving preference to the interests of the entity-the
state-in the other. The power struggle between population and geo-
graphical distribution was balanced.oo
The federal system was built with intentional parity between the
sovereign states and the people. When states designed their govern-
ments, the federal biennial model was imitated. If the system worked
on a federal level, why not at the state level?lol While such a balance
was unnecessary at a state or local level for the same reasons, many
states set up legislatures in which the senate was represented at least
partially by geography, and the house of representatives was based on
population.
That system began to crumble in the early 1960s with a series of
court decisions challenging the apportionment of state and local gov-
eruments.1O2 It soon became clear that the "only weighting of votes
sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of representation,
such as the allocation of Senators irrespective of population and the
97. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-17 (1964). See also NoRIus, supra note 12, at
355. When the federal legislative system was created, it was designed to emulate
the English organizational model. Id. at 277-78.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
99. Id. § 2.
100. See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 1-17 (1964); THE REcoRDs OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Ferrand & David Maydole Matteson eds.,
1937). This Article does not attempt to define or elaborate on the history of the
creation of our federal system of government or its rationale. The cursory expla-
nation provided was used most often during the debate over the creation of the
Nebraska Unicameral.
101. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 93; Levmore, supra note 27, at 161 n.43. See Norris'
Single House, supra note 8, at 10; Unicameral System Praised by Speaker, NEB.
CITY NEWS PRESS, at 1. In fact, many cities also followed suit creating duplicate
councils, each to serve as a check and balance on the other.
102. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)(extending the one person one
vote requirement to local governments); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964)(holding that the seats of both houses of a bicameral legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)(one
man, one vote); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)(holding that unequal state
legislative apportionment is justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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use of the electoral college in the choice of a President.... [O]nce the
class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified," the result
must be "one person, one vote."' 03
Bicameralism lost its main purpose after Reynolds v. Sims,1 0 4 in
which the doctrine of representation based on geography was chal-
lenged. In Reynolds, voters from Alabama sued state election officials
on the grounds that despite a constitutional requirement for appor-
tionment based on population, election districts failed to represent the
population base. Geographical representation created a system in
which approximately one quarter of the total population lived in dis-
tricts represented by a majority of the members in the Senate and the
House. The district court ordered temporary reapportionment for the
1962 general election and enjoined the officials from holding future
elections under the invalid plans. 0 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, determin-
ing that there was no justifiable basis to depart from the basic tenet of
equality among voters when apportioning seats in state legislatures.
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by vot-
ers, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representa-
tive form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of
government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the
right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our
political system.
1 0 6
The Supreme Court held that the goal of legislative apportionment
was fair representation of all,' 0 7 and the dilution of votes under the
Alabama plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court obviously recognized it had fired a blow to nearly every
biennial legislature in the country because it volunteered that bicam-
eralism would not be rendered "anachronistic and meaningless" under
a system that required both houses to be organized on the basis of
population.OS "A prime reason for bicameralism, modernly consid-
ered, is to insure mature and deliberate consideration of, and to pre-
vent precipitative action on, proposed legislative measures."1 0 9 What
the Court failed to consider was that "mature and deliberate consider-
ation" could take place without duplicating two houses of identical or
near identical representation. City councils and county and school
boards give such consideration without the need for a second council
or board to balance the deliberation. Two governors are not essential
103. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1964).
104. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
105. Id. at 542, 552.
106. Id. at 562.
107. Id. at 568.
108. Id- at 576-77. The court provides a lengthy commentary on the value of bicam-
eral legislatures and how they will continue to serve useful purposes.
109. Id. at 576.
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for proper and reasonable executive decisions; likewise, two trial
judges, two mayors, or two courts of appeals are unnecessary.
Legislative rules can allow for sufficient debate and require specific
time before final action is taken. Gubernatorial review acts as a check
and balance. After Reynolds, no matter how seats are allocated in a
bicameral state legislature, the voters will be represented twice.
While distribution may not be identical, the result will be the same.
Allocating votes to rural and urban areas cannot be diluted or ex-
panded when the requirement of one person one vote is followed. Add-
ing legislators cannot change that allocation. A second house simply
is a redundant and unnecessary duplication. After Reynolds v. Sims,
two houses simply are unnecessary.
It is argued that eliminating one house reduces the number of
checks and thus is a dangerous removal of protections built into the
two-house process. If each house represents two separate and distinct
entities, as in the federal system, this argument may have merit. Af-
ter the Court's ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, however, there can be no
such separate classes represented. No matter how the different distri-
bution is made between the house and the senate, each house must be
identical in jurisdiction and representation. The check and balance in
a bicameral state system by its nature will be a redundancy that slows
the process and allows members to conceal their own actions and to
shift responsibility to the other house.11o
The Supreme Court's analysis that bicameralism after Reynolds
still allows diversity in representation by establishing staggered
terms, different sizes of each house, and varying apportionment to
provide and encourage "differing complexions and collective attitudes
in the two bodies"'I can be realized without the complexity and dupli-
cation of two houses. The Nebraska Unicameral accomplishes the
same end by ensuring that each committee has representation from
the various geographical regions of the state. Moreover, membership
on the Committee on Committees, which determines the referencing
of bills, and the Executive Board, which governs the Legislature as a
whole, is allocated on the basis of congressional districts, thus guaran-
teeing representation by geography without destroying the concept of
equal representation. The final outcome is a simpler and more practi-
cal method of legislating.
110. Norris, One Branch Legislature, supra note 11, at 12. Of course, legislators in a
unicameral system can shift responsibility and attempt to hide their actions, but
the process makes it more difficult, particularly when the rules demand open
proceedings.
111. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
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B. Representative and Open Process
A nonpartisan unicameral is a more efficient, open, and represen-
tative method of legislating. In the Nebraska Unicameral, the process
of passing laws is simple. The passage of legislation entails introduc-
tion of a bill, reference to a committee, deliberation by the committee
and the body as a whole, passage, and final action by the governor.
Each step is distinct and final. Time spent trying to reconcile differ-
ences or create compromises between two houses is eliminated. The
assembly on the whole is relatively small in size, which promotes full
and thorough debate by each member of all measures before the Legis-
lature. With only one house, committees are fewer in number and
smaller in membership, encouraging open debate by each member.
As Norris stated, the conference committee in most states can op-
erate as a secretive, nonrepresentative separate legislature. By elimi-
nating the conference committee to resolve differences between the
houses, each senator is held responsible at every stage of the debate.
Senators cannot blame a conference committee or the other house.
Full responsibility for every action rests with only one body. Members
cannot pass the buck or shift responsibility to another body.112 No
system is more directly representative of the people than a
unicameral.
Because each vote is final-that is, it cannot be reversed by a sec-
ond house or conference committee-the entire process is open to the
scrutiny of the media and the public at large. This is true especially
when the rules require that committee votes be recorded by roll and
when any member can request a record vote at any stage of the pro-
ceeding.il 3 The responsibility for action or inaction is placed squarely
where it belongs-on the elected representative. While the responsi-
bility of action or inaction also is placed on the elected official in a
bicameral system, the public has more difficulty holding the official
accountable because a member can shift responsibility. The process
simply is less visible to the public in a bicameral system.
If state legislative bodies are to be "a substitute for a meeting of
the citizens in person,""i4 the best and simplest method of ensuring
that the citizenry is truly and openly represented is via a unicameral
system. A single house eliminates the ability of conferees to secretly
resolve compromises to suit themselves, special interests, or their
112. All senators' votes are public record, which results in complete accountability. Of
course, procedural games still can be played whereby a committee fails to ad-
vance a bill or legislation never reaches the floor for debate. In these instances,
the responsibility clearly is evident by a review of the record. NEB. CoNsT. art.
m, § ii.
113. Neb. Unicam. Rule 7, § 2(b) (1997).
114. James S. Wrona & L. Francis Cissna, Switching Sides: Is Party Affiliation a Tie
that Binds?, 28 Ai. ST. L.J. 735, 753 (1996)(citation omitted).
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party leadership. All decisions and votes are made in full public view.
Every senator has full opportunity to publicly support, oppose, or sug-
gest changes to legislation. The possibility that special interests can
control or manipulate the results behind the scenes is reduced when
the entire process is open to public scrutiny. A vigilant and watchful
electorate or media can expose individual or special interest manipu-
lation of voting and results. The small size of the body allows the pub-
lic to follow the actions of their representatives closely and to pass a
fair judgement on the results.
C. Nonpartisanship
The most innovative feature of the Nebraska Unicameral is its
nonpartisan nature. Senators are elected on a local ballot without re-
gard to party affiliation.115 The top two candidates in the primary
election proceed to the general election. The candidate with the most
votes in the general election is seated. "The election of members of the
legislature on a nonpartisan ticket has attracted many candidates
with envious records of public service who had not sought office on a
partisan ticket."116 The elimination of partisan organization was the
brainchild and passion of Senator Norris. It also was the one feature
to which he would not compromise. 1 7 He insisted that the problems
of the biennial system largely were due to partisan game playing. He
saw how elected officials were forced to represent the party rather
than their constituents. He hated the system that granted favors to
those who were loyal to their party's leadership through rewards of
"good" committee assignments, opportunities to introduce or pass leg-
islation, and opportunities to guarantee reelection or defeat.
Norris thought state government was detached from national
party platforms. Why should a national party, which takes positions
on issues of tariffs and foreign trade or war and peace, control the
policy positions of local elections? Instead, local government should be
run like a business.13s No business would organize with two boards of
115. NEB. CONST. art. Il, § 7.
116. Srb, supra note 3, at 632.
117. NEUBERGER & KAHN, supra note 21, at 282. Both political parties opposed the
passage of the initiative. Id.
118. Norris advocated running the state like a corporation.
The state would be similar to a gigantic corporation and the members of
the legislature would be members of the board of directors....
Without being handicapped on account of any partisanship matters,
they would be able to give the best that was in them for the welfare of
the state.
George W. Norris, Small, One-Chamber Legislature Ideal for State Like Ne-
braska, Says Norris, LiNcoLN J. STAR, Feb. 12, 1933.
See also Norris, One Branch Legislature, supra note 11, at 13; Norris Would Re-
duce Burden on Voters, LiNcoLN J. STAR, Feb. 23, 1934, at 13; Seven Hundred
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directors. The business of the state needs statesmen, not politicians.
Voters should judge candidates based on their records and positions,
not on the positions taken by candidates for federal offices. State offi-
cials are in a better position to represent their districts than a party
leader who may be far removed from the local issues and may not un-
derstand the benefit or detriment of a given position.
In practice, the nonpartisan feature requires the senators to main-
tain contact with their constituent base, and not simply with party
platforms. There must be constant communication with the voters.
Senators rarely determine how to vote based only on which party in-
troduced the legislation. As the amount of legislation increases and
issues become more complex, the representative from both the uni-
cameral and bicameral legislature must devote time and effort to un-
derstanding the nuances of the issues. Legislators in a nonpartisan
system, however, will understand the effect of the legislation on their
constituency because that constituency is the primary, if not the sole
factor and motivation for legislative action. The possibility that party
leadership will "dictate" a position or a vote is virtually eliminated.
Support in the nonpartisan system for minority or opposing party
ideas and legislation is not only allowed, but is commonplace.
When chairpersons are elected based on personality and leader-
ship skills, party platforms lose their importance. The Speaker is not
elected solely because he or she belongs to the majority or has served
the longest. As a result, the Speaker does not owe the political party
loyalty; rather, the Speaker owes allegiance to the members as a
whole. While the Speaker has the power to set the agenda according
to a party platform, it is this Author's experience that the Speaker
instead determines the most critical issues requiring debate and sets
the calendar accordingly. In the past several years, attempts have
been made to strengthen the Speaker's power to expedite issues,
speedup debate, and determine priorities.119 While these efforts have
been successful, the true power of the Speaker lies in the ability to
gain the confidence of the other members and to build consensus when
issues become deadlocked. The leadership becomes personal rather
than party-based. When confidence and credibility are established,
the Speaker can be and is a dynamic and effective force.
Both the Speaker and majority party are powerless to give favors
of committee leadership. As the system is nonpartisan, the chairman-
ship of committees is selected by the entire membership. Because any
member can run for a leadership position, senators with specific ex-
pertise often are elected to chairmanships. Turnover of committee
leadership is reduced because positions are unaffected when party
Hear the "One-House" Debate, GRAND IsLAND DAiLY INDEP., Oct. 15, 1934, re-
printed in 78 Cong. Rec. 3278 (1934).
119. Neb. Unicam. Rule 1, §§ 7, 17.
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power changes. The continuity of governance leads to a greater con-
sistency in the understanding of issues and positions. As every mem-
ber is an equal member in the Unicameral, the most important
consideration is the effect legislation will have on a member's
constituency.
Even so, members can face consequences for refusing to cooperate
or build a consensus. As in any organization, the failure to work with
others may result in "punishment." "Games" are still played, but they
are different. Coalitions can mete out favors and punishment for not
"following" the coalition. The difference is they are based on personal-
ity or ideology rather than party lines. While "games" occur in both
systems, in the Unicameral they are not based solely on partisan polit-
ical lines. In a partisan system, an opportunity to introduce legisla-
tion depends entirely on the majority party's favor; leadership
assignments are given only to the majority party and even then only
to loyal members. The opposition's ideas are disparaged simply be-
cause they are minority party positions. The nonpartisan structure
does not automatically eliminate blind loyalty or encourage dissent.
Rather, it creates the opportunity for coalition-building. This opportu-
nity for cooperation and consensus-building often crosses party lines.
The outcome is the potential for results based on constituency need
and less chance of partisan bickering and gridlock.
D. Leadership
One criticism often leveled at the nonpartisan legislature is that it
is devoid of leadership. When everyone is equal, everyone is in charge,
and thus no one is in charge. Critics have challenged this system
since the beginning of the Unicameral,12o and these arguments have
some merit. Legislation may languish because the system lacks struc-
ture and legislators lack the power to push it through to completion.
Coalitions may break down because party discipline cannot demand
members to stay together. A majority of votes may be difficult to ob-
tain because there are literally forty-nine different opinions on the is-
sue. Plainly, passing legislation involves more work when the
leadership is diffused and everyone has a say in the outcome. Without
a party structure to advance legislation, the process actually may take
longer, which is directly opposite to the theory that unicameralism
leads to faster legislation.
Yet, broad-based leadership can be positive. That senators and in-
terest groups must build consensus to reach agreement potentially
leads to better reasoned and more thoroughly debated legislation.
Leadership in a nonpartisan one-house legislature is based on the
power of the individual, rather than on the power of the party. In any
120. 86 CONG. REc. app. at 330 (1940).
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given year, leadership may be lacking in the Unicameral just as it
would be in a bicameral legislature. When individual leadership in
the bicameral is weak, the party is substituted. When individual lead-
ership in the nonpartisan Unicameral is weak, no immediate substi-
tute emerges. That is why a lack of leadership is more evident in a
nonpartisan system. When individual leadership is lacking in a uni-
cameral, other forces often come to bear-the governor, coalitions of
urban, rural, or ideological viewpoints, or public sentiment. While the
delay that often occurs may be frustrating, the end result may be
worth the wait.
Without a partisan base to push legislation and to hold senators
accountable, the irrational games based on which party is in power
and the possibility of gridlock due to partisan bickering are reduced.
A common complaint from the public about the federal system is that
office holders worry more about whether the other party will succeed
than they worry about the public at large. Name-calling and finger-
pointing often occur to discredit and disparage the other party. Nega-
tivity escalates. Procedural shenanigans tie up the process. In the
end, the public becomes disenchanted, disengaged, and cynical.
Rarely is there an organized display of partisan bickering or finger-
pointing in the Nebraska Unicameral. Procedure is used to slow down
legislation or to gain an advantage, but it seldom is used for the pur-
pose of publicly discrediting the other party or its leaders. Gridlock as
a result of partisanship, so common in Washington and many state
partisan systems, is almost nonexistent.
The possibility does exist in a nonpartisan system for senators in
the minority to exert undue influence over the process. In practice,
there are times when one or more senators can slow down the proce-
dure and prevent legislation from advancing. Filibusters and dead-
locks occur in every session, but the practice of using the rules to slow
down or prevent legislation is not unique to the nonpartisan or uni-
cameral process. The difference is that in a partisan system the pur-
pose is often solely to disparage or embarrass the other party.121
Finally, it is this Author's belief that there is fundamentally little
difference between the ideologies of the two major parties on a local
level. Conservative and liberal philosophies do not necessarily line up
neatly with Republican and Democratic labels. Party platform often is
ignored locally when it does not square with the candidate's personal
views. There is not the striking contrast between philosophies today
that has historically inspired impassioned party loyalty.122 It is in-
121. While partisan debates often are based on ideological positions, the gridlock often
occurs because of parliamentary games intended to prevent the minority party
from securing legislation or favorable media attention.
122. The position of voters on issues that create zealous support or opposition, such as
abortion, term limits, or gun control, often cross party lines. Polls of the public
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cumbent for the voting public to know the candidate or office holder
and their personal views and beliefs; it is not enough to know simply
that the individual is a Democrat or a Republican. Such labels do not
provide enough information as to a candidate's philosophy or
convictions. 12 3
If the thesis is true that voters look at individual positions and
viewpoints rather than party affiliation, a nonpartisan system should
provide as much, if not more, information for choosing local candidates
because voters cannot rely on stereotypical party labels to make
decisions.
E. Lobby
There was tremendous fear that by eliminating one house, the
lobby and special interests would gain in power and influence and con-
trol the Legislature. This fear simply has not materialized. While it
is difficult to gauge the power that any special interest group has on
any representative body, the process would suggest that it is more, not
indicate that just as many Democrats as Republicans support abortion rights and
gun control. During the 1996 Democratic and Republican conventions, it was re-
ported that the Republicans sounded like Democrats by featuring pro-choice
speakers such as Congresswoman Susan Molinari, and the Democrats imitated
Republicans by talking about tax cuts. Kim Cobb, Democrats Firm on Platform:
Blueprint Similar to GOP's but Acknowledge Disagreements, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Aug. 28, 1996, at 8; David Lightman, Democratic Shift on Issues Blurs Lines Be-
tween Parties, HARTFORD CouRANT, Sept. 7, 1996, at 1; Platform Vague, Like
Party Itself, ARIz. REPUBLIC/PHOENX GAZETTE, Aug. 29, 1996, at 5; All Things
Considered: Liberals Hope Clinton's Words Hiding Liberal Beliefs (NPR radio
broadcast, Aug. 30, 1996).
123. Nationally, it has become the trend for voters to give more weight to candidates'
positions rather than their party label. "[Ilndividuals now tend to cast their votes
for candidates, not political parties." Wrona & Cissna, supra note 114, at 740.
According to Wrona and Cissna, the vast majority of voters vote for the person,
not the party:
In 1956, 74% of respondents to a Gallup poll agreed with the belief that
one should vote for the candidate not the party. By 1968, that figure had
risen to 84%.... In 1986, 92% of those surveyed agreed with the state-
ment: "I always vote for the person who I think is best, regardless of
what party they belong to."
Id. at 772 n.23. See also MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CEN-
TERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s (1991).
Interestingly, there was much debate about whether or not political parties
should be permanently established by our founding fathers. George Washington
warned against the creation of the party structure. Wrona & Cissna, supra note
114, at 735. The current party structure evolved from the early Federalist and
Democratic Republican parties, with the parties eventually forming around the
competing philosophies of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 735.
See also WILFRED E. BINELEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR NATURAL HIS-
TORY (4th ed. 1962). The point is that party philosophy originally was based on
clear differences of opinion. Those differences of opinion often are blurred at a
local level.
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less, difficult to influence legislation in the Unicameral. In a bicam-
eral system, the conference committee wields tremendous power. It
can completely change, alter, or eliminate legislation. When the resul-
tant legislation is returned to each house for decision, no changes can
be made. The conference committee is a lobbyist's dream. Lobbies
need to persuade or influence only a small number of legislators to
enable or prevent passage of legislation. Lobbying legislation outside
the conference is simpler in a partisan system as the lobby often needs
only to convince leadership to secure passage. Leadership, with its
partisan power over members, can secure a sufficient number of legis-
lators who vote the "right" way. Those who do not join jeopardize fu-
ture favors and opportunities.
In Nebraska, without a partisan structure, the lobbyist's job is
more difficult. Just as the Speaker must synchronize "the efforts of
nearly fifty unaffiliated senators," so must the lobby.124 Each senator
is an individual who must be considered separately. The lobbyist can-
not depend on the power of the majority or minority leaders. The lob-
byist must know the constituency of each senator to know how to
approach him or her. Contacts must be made with a minimum of
twenty-five senators, not simply with the leaders, to determine
whether there is the requisite support on a particular bill or issue. As
all proceedings are open and all votes are potentially public, the poten-
tial that a senator can be controlled by a special interest is limited.
All action is available for the media to report or for an opponent to
exploit during the next election.
F. Balance by the Executive
The most frequently offered reason for maintaining two houses is
that each house acts as a check and balance on the other. No legisla-
tion can be passed without agreement from both houses. This argu-
ment makes sense when potentially competing interests or the
sovereign interest of the state is different than the individual's. As
indicated earlier, it is impossible under the United States Constitu-
tion to allow geographical representation under the proposition that
each person is entitled to equal representation. In reality, therefore,
no real check or balance results; it is simply a duplicative process.
In Nebraska, once legislation has passed through the requisite four
readings and has received a majority of votes on Final Reading, only
one final step remains in the legislative process before the legislation
becomes law. The Governor must sign or veto the bill.125 The Gover-
nor acts as a representative of the State as a whole. It is the Gover-
124. SrrriG, supra note 1, at 19.
125. If the Governor declines to sign a bill within five days, the bill automatically will
become law without his or her signature. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
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nor's duty to ensure the popular view is taken and parochial interests
do not control. As a statewide officeholder, the Governor is the true
check and balance. To reach the most acceptable result, he or she can
review legislation, refuse its passage if it is detrimental or inappropri-
ate, and negotiate a compromise before a bill is passed. The second
house is unnecessary as a check when the executive already serves
that function. The Governor can act as the check and balance in a
more efficient, cost-effective manner than a second house.
G. Summary of Strengths
As Senator Norton stated at the end of the first Unicameral ses-
sion, the problems of the Unicameral were the same as those in the
bicameral, but the benefits belong to the unicameral alone. Other leg-
islatures have problems with lobbyists, lack of leadership, gridlock,
and partisan games. The Unicameral has its defects as well. But, the
most important features of the Nebraska system, the lack of partisan-
ship and the elimination of one house, provide benefits that partisan
bicameral systems cannot provide.
Eliminating the need for conference committees reduces the likeli-
hood that secret negotiations and the lobby will influence legislation.
Reducing the system to one house creates a more efficient system
without sacrificing the opportunity to pass well-reasoned legislation.
A simple, open system places responsibility on legislators to answer
their constituencies while giving the public sufficient information to
judge the performance of its elected officials. Public hearings and
three separate votes by the entire legislature provide opportunity for
public and senatorial input and reasoned deliberation. Leadership
elected by secret ballot without regard to party affiliation allows the
best person to be considered for positions of authority in the body.
Elimination of party bosses who allocate pork and secure loyalty and
votes for party positions allows each member the opportunity to play
an equal part in the process and creates debate focused less on party
lines and more on ideology. Finally, the Governor and the public act
as checks and balances by reviewing legislation and offering potential
changes.
V. THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE WILL REMAIN THE SOLE
UNICAMERAL
Immediately following the passage of the unicameral initiative,
delegations of legislators from other states flooded Nebraska. The
Political Science Department of the University of Nebraska received
more than 4000 inquiries about the new process. "Within 3 months
bills for one-house Legislatures were pending in 18 states. More than
half the states.., had such measures introduced and New York and
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New Jersey [had] special commissions studying the subject."12 6 De-
spite the interest, no other state followed suit.
Interest in Nebraska's Unicameral continues. Senators, political
scientists, and others who are simply intrigued regularly travel to Lin-
coln to study the virtues of Nebraska's one house, nonpartisan system.
Montana, North Dakota, and California studied the idea in the 1970s.
Mississippi, Florida, and Minnesota all contemplated unicameralism
more recently.' 27 Again, no state made the leap. Nebraska remains
unique as the only nonpartisan and unicameral legislature. "It's sort
of a lost cause,"i 28 according to Dale Olsen, a unicameral enthusiast
and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University
of Minnesota at Duluth. "It's just not catching on because, if you're a
state legislator, switching from a bicameral system can mean voting
yourself out of a job."129
As other states' efforts to review the unicameral process continue,
efforts to dismantle it from within take place. While the one-house
feature seems well-established and stable,i 3 0 the nonpartisan aspect
regularly comes under fire. 13 1 As early as 1939, formal attempts were
made in the Legislature to return to a partisan system. Beginning in
1954 for the Republicans and 1956 for the Democrats, and continuing
through the early 1970s, both party platforms expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the nonpartisan system.' 3 2 As of a decade ago, more than a
dozen attempts had been made to reestablish partisanship.13 3 These
efforts have ranged from legislative attempts to initiative petitions.
All have failed. The Legislature and the public appear to support the
nonpartisan feature.
In the final analysis, change is difficult. To truly achieve change,
there must be an advocate-someone who is willing to fight for the
cause and secure the victory. George Norris was that champion. His
passion and zealous interest in the issue caught fire. Due to his argu-
126. Nebraska R.F.D. to F.D.R., supra note 9, at 17.
127. Rick Atkinson, Nebraska Still Alone on 1-House System, OmAHA WoRLD HE L ,
Apr. 10, 1990, at 7.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. NoNPATis~A'qs~m I THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 19. See also SIT-
TIG, supra note 1.
131. NomNATixsrpm IN THE LEGISLATrvE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 19-20.
132. Id. at 20-21. Beginning with the 1954 Nebraska Republican Party platform, a
return to a partisan legislature was advocated. "We favor amendment of the
Constitution of Nebraska to provide for members of the legislature of this state
on a partisan basis...." Id. In one form or another, a similar proposal was
continued in the Republican Party platforms of 1954, 1956, 1960 and 1962. Dem-
ocratic party platforms paralleled Republican advocacy for a partisan legislature.
133. SrrmG, supra note 1, at 29. But see O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 6. This Author's
view is that there have been no serious threats to the Legislature's nonpartisan
system.
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ments and fervor, the public was willing to take the chance to trans-
form their legislative form of government from the tried and true
model into one that had never been ventured. It was the unique com-
bination of Senator Norris' zeal and the public's overwhelming sup-
port and respect for the forty-year veteran of Congress that the
unicameral initiative succeeded in Nebraska.
The common explanation for why Nebraska is the lone nonpartisan
legislature is that senators will not vote themselves out of existence.
The answer is more complicated. Norris was right when he said that
the public is leery of governmental innovation. Norris understood
that changes in government are met with much skepticism.
New inventions and simplified methods are always given hearty support in all
lines of human endeavor having to do with the improvement of the conditions
which control and govern the activities of man. This has not always been so in
government but the tendency has been to stay in the rut in which our forefa-
thers toiled and any proposed change is looked upon by many of our people
with distrust and suspicion.1
3 4
Unless another Norris is found who can champion the cause and gar-
ner the esteem of the voters, any attempt at change most likely will be
in vain. While change is met more easily in business and personal
lives, it is not so for the respected and time-tested institution of gov-
ernment. There is no need to change the process that appears ade-
quate and is understood.
As an observer and a participant in the Nebraska system, this Au-
thor believes our process is far superior to partisan two-house sys-
tems. This Article has been my attempt to persuade the reader that
the system is worth consideration and that it has features that can
lead to advantageous results. It is efficient, open, and effective, but
unless one can experience the process and see the benefits first hand,
it is unlikely that there will be any effort to trade a process that is
comfortable for one that is unfamiliar. Although change is difficult, it
can lead to great results if one is willing to make the effort.
In this 60th anniversary year of the Nebraska Unicameral, we cel-
ebrate George Norris' dream, its continuation, its correctness, and the
results of the unicameral experiment.
134. George W. Norris, Foreword to SENNING, supra note 2, at xi.
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